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14.  Darwin at work: how to explain legal 
change in transnational and European 
private law
Jan M. Smits*
1. INTRODUCTION
This contribution aims to apply some insights from evolutionary theory to transnational 
private law and in particular to the harmonisation of private law in the European Union.1 
By doing so, it hopes to provide a fresh perspective to the theoretical underpinning of 
the development of both transnational commercial law and European private law. For 
transnational commercial law, it has already been well explained that the transformation 
of the role of the State led to new forms of governance.2 If  there was previously a State 
monopoly on providing legal certainty and enforcement mechanisms, today the goods of 
legal certainty and enforcement are often provided by others rather than the State insti-
tutions, in particular in cross- border transactions. In European private law, an organic 
development – in which the role of the national States is also rather limited – is the most 
likely way to create a successful uni!ed law.3 Both developments raise many questions. 
This contribution only aims at providing a framework to deal with one of these ques-
tions: how to explain the evolution of law beyond the State (of which transnational com-
mercial law and European private law are important examples)?4 If  legal development 
can no longer be explained by positivist or natural law thinking, can evolutionary theory 
!ll the gap?
As there are many varieties of evolutionary theory, it seems !rst necessary to sketch 
the speci!c evolutionary framework on which this chapter is built. Section 2 therefore 
sets out the analytical presuppositions underlying the application of evolutionary ideas 
to the development of private law. This framework is a relatively simple one, building on 
the core of Darwin’s idea of natural selection. Section 3 subsequently goes on to apply 
the general framework to understand legal change (looking at law as an organism), while 
section 4 takes the argument one step further by applying some evolutionary lessons to 
transnational commercial law and European private law. Section 4 raises the important 
* This paper is based on the lecture given at the conference Law, The State, And Evolutionary 
Theory, University of Bremen, 5 October 2007.
 1 It builds on two previous articles: Smits (2002b) and Smits (2002).
 2 See e.g. Calliess (2008) and Peer Zumbansen (2006).
 3 See further Smits (2002a).
 4 See now Michaels Jansen (2006).
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question of what we can learn from evolutionary analysis of law, if  anything. Section 5 
draws some conclusions.
2.  THE THEORETICAL MODEL: A DARWINIAN 
EVOLUTIONARY FRAMEWORK
Despite the many variations in evolutionary thinking,5 the core of the theory of evolu-
tion as developed in Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species6 is clear enough. It is 
that change in organisms takes place through natural selection. The individual members 
of a species organise their lives as to produce the most surviving o"spring and in doing 
so, they necessarily adapt themselves to changing circumstances.7 The descent of one or 
more trees of life thus leads to a diversity of species through speciation, extinction and 
the evolving of new characteristics within these species. In Darwinism, this process of 
evolution by natural selection presupposes three requirements.8 First, there must be vari-
ation in species (otherwise some species could not better survive than others); second, 
the variation must concern variation in !tness (understood as the ability to survive and 
reproduce, some species being more able to adapt themselves to changing circumstances 
than others); third, the characteristics constituent for the !tness of the species must be 
inherited, meaning they must be able to move from one generation to the next. This 
means that the heritable favourable traits become more common in future generations, 
while the non- favourable traits become less common, allowing adaptation of the species 
as such. Only with these three constituents, a ‘struggle for life’ in the Darwinian sense can 
originate.9
This idea of development being driven by natural (spontaneous) selection is an 
extremely successful one. Daniel C. Dennett characterizes Darwin’s view as the ‘single 
best idea anyone has ever had’,10 claiming that evolutionary theory o"ers the only expla-
nation for structural change, regardless of the discipline involved. The idea was indeed 
applied to many other disciplines outside of biology, including political theory,11 ethics,12 
economics13 and psychology.14 Like in case of ‘real’ organisms, also social systems and the 
human brain are then considered to be developing in a spontaneous way. Consequently, 
their development is made dependent on two di"erent factors. On the one hand, there is 
the external environment in which the organism has to survive, while on the other hand 
there are the internal qualities of the organism itself. The latter decide to what extent 
 5 The wide variety of approaches the German Law Journal is evidence of this. Also see Kitcher 
(2005).
 6 Darwin (1859).
 7 See Rodgers (1998) and Sober (1984).
 8 Sober (1993).
 9 Id., 9 and Kitcher (note 5), 821.
10 Dennett (1995), 21. Also see Wilson (1998), declaring biology to be the mother of all science.
11 Hayek (1973–1979).
12 By e.g. Wilson (1975) and Alexander (1987).
13 See e.g. Hodgson (1993a) and (1993b).
14 See e.g. Plotkin (1979).
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adaptation to a changing environment is really possible. Put otherwise: evolution is 
dependent on both nature (in organisms: the genes) and nurture (the environment).
One can argue about the extent to which either nature or nurture is decisive for the 
development of an organism. Thus, several years ago the debate about the most impor-
tant determinant of human behaviour seemed to have been won by the nurture factor. 
It was in line with the mainstream cultural climate of the 1960s and 1970s that human 
behaviour would not primarily be dependent on human genes as this would go against 
the idea of society being ‘made’ by human intervention and equal opportunities for 
everyone. It was more of Jean- Jacques Rousseau’s idea of a human being as a tabula rasa: 
man is born noble and subsequently spoiled by its environment. Today, however, nature 
is recognized to be just as important as nurture in explaining human behaviour.15 Thus, 
Steven Pinker explains how the ‘blank slaters’ based their idea of equal opportunities for 
everyone on the wrong assumption that all people have the same genes.16 This is not the 
place to delve deeply into this debate; it su#ces to say that if  law is looked at as an organ-
ism being steered by spontaneous selection of rules, both the factor of nature (the intrin-
sic characteristic of the law) and the factor of nurture (the socio- economic and cultural 
environment in which the law operates) need to be taken into account.
3.  UNDERSTANDING LEGAL CHANGE: LAW AS AN 
ORGANISM
If natural selection is indeed the main factor steering the development of organisms, 
the question is whether the development of law can also be seen as guided by this evo-
lutionary process. On !rst sight, this view may seem mistaken as law is usually seen as 
either given by some authority (like a legislator or a court) or as derived from some 
transcendental nature (like in natural law thinking). But this argument is mistaken: what 
the evolutionary perspective has to o"er is an external account of how law develops. It 
does not inform us about the contents of law, but only explains why the law develops as 
it does. This evolutionary perspective was already applied in the 19th century by, inter 
alia, Friedrich Von Savigny17 and Henry Sumner Maine18 but it gradually disappeared 
behind a horizon of more positivist and transcendental accounts of legal development.19 
However, as Section 4 demonstrates, looking at law as a spontaneous order of which the 
development is dependent on both external and internal factors can sometimes be sur-
prisingly insightful.
This section looks at the theoretical hurdles to overcome when applying an evolution-
ary framework to legal change. The three requirements for natural selection (identi!ed in 
Section 2) therefore need to be transplanted to the legal domain. Can we do so?
The !rst requirement for natural selection is variation in species. The equivalent of 
15 See further Wilson (1975).
16 Pinker (2002).
17 Savigny (1814), and (1840).
18 Sumner Maine (1861).
19 Leaving aside the relevance of their work today, Cf. Elliott (1985), 43: ‘by modern standards 
Savigny’s work seems hopelessly metaphorical and unscienti!c’. Also see Clark (1981).
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this requirement in law is the existence of diverse national (and sometimes European) 
legal rules to solve identical problems. In private law, we have various rules on, e.g., the 
bindingness of an o"er, on tort liability and on transfer of property. These rules mainly 
evolved in national (socio- economic and cultural) environments. They sometimes relate 
to essential di"erences between jurisdictions that re$ect di"ering views of society (such as 
di"ering levels of solidarity, of duties to help others, levels of social security, etc.).
Second, these rules are also likely to vary in !tness. Many of the present day rules in 
the various European countries are the result of a long evolution during which these 
rules were adapted to the environment they had to operate in. According to evolution-
ary theory, other rules that once existed in these countries must have been eliminated in 
this process of natural selection and any change of the environ ment in the future would 
– again – lead to adaptation of the present rules. Some rules may become extinct while 
others become more important. Legal history shows telling examples of this process. 
Thus, the rule on laesio enormis and the numerus clausus of  contracts in Roman law had 
to go because they no longer !t the economic environment after the Middle Ages. Rules 
on animal trials were abolished because of new societal insights. And also the rule that 
only men could vote for Parliament had to be replaced because of a changing societal and 
political environment.
The third requirement for natural selection (the charac teristics constituent for the !tness 
of the species must be inherited) is more problematic in the context of law. This is because 
of the simple fact that descendants taking over the genes of their predecessors do not exist. 
Rules do not procreate in the literal sense of the word. But one can think of an analogy 
with genes. In evolutionary economics, Nelson and Winter have used routines as playing 
the same role in !rms as genes do in organisms.20 The routines of a !rm establish a stable 
identity of the !rm that endures over time and – just like genes – programme its behaviour. 
As long as the routine is pro!table, !rms stick to it. The same analogy can be used in law. 
Rules are not just rules: they are learnt by students and applied in practice. Normally, 
agents (in our case: the legal actors) will not deviate from these rules because of consid-
erations of legal certainty and equality. In this sense, the practice of application is being 
transferred from one generation to another. And just like genes in biological organisms, 
these rules may gradually change under in$uence of a changing environment (society).
The possibility to apply these general requirements for evolution to the law allows us 
to see legal change as a process dependent on both the nature (the inherent characteris-
tics) and the nurture (the environment) of the law. The next question is what this means 
exactly for the development of transnational commercial law and European private law. 
Can we indeed apply general evolutionary lessons to these areas?
4.  EVOLUTIONARY LESSONS FOR TRANSNATIONAL AND 
EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW?
The present debate about the development of transnational commercial law and 
European private law is to a large extent determined by its normative character: it usually 
20 Vromen (1997).
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takes as a starting point that present national rules are not always suited to deal with 
transnational commercial relationships or with transactions on the European internal 
market. Subsequently, one goes on to de!ne the desired substantive rules that would 
better re$ect the needs of an international market. This is very clear in the present 
debate about European private law, in which the question about the need for a common 
European law seems to be less important than e"orts to draft actual rules.21 In this view, 
as in other opinions of how a more uniform European private law should be achieved, 
diversity of law is often looked at as a coincidence or historical accident. In this respect, 
these views focus on what is at the normative level a desired development. But evolution-
ary theory has the potential to inform us whether establishing uniform law is also likely to 
happen in this way. The present view falls short of how likely it is that uni!cation e"orts, 
both at the European and at the global level, will succeed and, if  so, how this uni!cation 
is likely to take place. In the following, three di"erent evolutionary insights are tested on 
their usefulness for this harmonization debate.
4.1 The Importance of ‘Nature’: Path Dependence and Legal Change
The !rst possible insight is about the importance of nature.22 The development of any 
organism is to a large extent governed by its own characteristics and not so much by its 
environment. This means that organisms are shaped by transformations in the past that 
are now irreversible. Human beings will never be able to run the hundred metres in three 
seconds because their legs and lungs were formed in an environment in which it was 
apparently not so important to be able to run that fast in order to survive. These charac-
teristics are now constraints upon adaptive change23 or, put otherwise, the future devel-
opment is a"ected by the path it has traced out in the past. In biology, it was Stephen J. 
Gould who pointed out that evolution often depends on ‘accidents’, leading to a so- called 
eccentric path.24 In economics, it is well known that the most e#cient organizations may 
not come out on top because of irreversible decisions made in the past.25
The importance of path dependence was also recognized for law.26 Sometimes rules 
have become extinct in their past environment even though they could still serve a useful 
purpose today. A good example of this phenomenon is the elimination of mechanisms 
that decide which promises are binding and which are not. Causa and laesio enormis 
served this particular purpose in continental Europe before the great codi!cations.27 
However, these concepts lost their main function in the nineteenth century because of 
their uselessness in a system that put more emphasis on the intention to create legal 
relationships and on the absolute bindingness of contracts. It would have been fruitful to 
have these concepts available at a later stage, when contract law had to !nd new ways to 
decide which contracts were binding upon the parties and which were not. But in most 
21 See now the draft Common Frame of Reference: Bar et al. (eds) (2008).
22 This section is based on my account of path dependence in Smits (note 1), 79.
23 Hirshleifer (1993).
24 Gould (1989).
25 Hodgson, supra note 13, 204.
26 See e.g. Roe (1996).
27 On this, see Gordley (1991) and Gordley and Von Mehren (2006), 461.
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European legal systems, courts were not able to refer to these concepts anymore: they 
now had to use other legal concepts like good faith and the reliance principle to reach 
desired results in concrete cases.
It seems useful to look at path dependence in somewhat more detail if  we want to 
establish how it in$uences transnational private law. Mark J. Roe28 makes an interest-
ing distinction between weak and strong path dependence. Weak path dependence only 
explains what has survived; it does not entail that the survivor is better than another: ‘a 
society chose between two institutions and the choice became embedded, but the chosen 
institution functions as well as the one discarded would have.’29 A road may be built at 
either the left bank or the right bank of the river, but the left bank is not in itself  any 
‘better’ than the right bank.
In case of this weak- form path dependence, there are no obstacles for harmonization. 
The types of rules one would think of as touched by this form are those related to more 
technical aspects of law. Whether prescription periods or other time- related devices in law 
are two years, !ve years or ten years is usually arbitrary. On the other hand, an evolution 
toward some ‘best’ rule is not really feasible here either. Courts are usually not willing to 
reconsider these types of legal norms once they are put into place by the legislator. In 
this case, harmonization is therefore only possible through the imposition of a rule in a 
centralist way.
This makes it important to identify these more ‘technical’ rules from other types of 
rules. Alan Watson seems to attribute a large role to such arbitrary rules: ‘The truth of the 
matter seems to be that many legal rules make little impact on individuals, and that very 
often it is important that there be a rule; but what rule actually is adopted is of restricted 
signi!cance for general human happiness.’30 As far as the substantive parts of contract 
law, tort law and the law of property are concerned, I would rather not qualify these as 
examples of weak- form path dependence. I do not endorse the view that it is indi"erent 
which rule to adopt and that any evolution towards ‘better’ rules (i.e. better suited for 
their environment than others) is impossible.
This is not to say that path dependence does not play a role in the traditional private 
law disciplines. To the contrary: forms other than weak path dependence31 are certainly 
present. If  we assume that the Europeanization of private law presents a crisis in the 
evolutionary sense, the path already taken may thus prevent the best possible rules for 
the new European environment from evolving. Evolution leading to a great amount of 
uniformity is the least probable where it is only possible to change the present rules at 
the expense of high cost. This is the least the case with rules that many people rely upon; 
on the other hand, the amount of uniformity to be attained should theoretically be the 
most in the case of rules that are only of use for parties that set these rules themselves. 
Gambaro states the following about the law of real property:
When one considers the nature of various property rights (obligations between neighbours, 
riparian rights, condominium law, rights of super!cies, servitudes, and the like), it becomes 
28 Roe, supra note 26, 646.
29 Id., 647.
30 Watson (1974).
31 See further Roe (note 26), 648.
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rather clear that much property law is deeply rooted in locally developed legal traditions. And, 
for this reason it is better left to those local legal traditions which for hundreds of years have 
addressed these issues in the manner most adapted to the locality.32
Gambaro is certainly right, but the reason why these rules are looked at as most adapted 
to the ‘locality’, has, in my view, more to do with the investments already made in the 
path of property law and from which it is too costly to deviate, than with ‘the nature’ of 
property rights. To change national law in the areas mentioned by Gambaro would mean 
that third parties’ interests have to be reconsidered on a very large scale. The reliance of 
the parties involved on the existence of ‘absolute’ rights that have e"ect erga omnes would 
be violated if  the applicable rules on, for example, the establishment of limited real rights 
and the registration of these rights would be eliminated or even changed. The taking into 
account of so many di"erent interests has led to delicate static systems of property law 
with – most of the time – a numerus clausus of limited real rights. Moreover, to get to 
know the ins and outs of property law in a speci!c system is far more di#cult than to get 
to know a country’s law of contract: the information costs of the former are higher.33 In 
this sense, property law is indeed stuck in a ‘local equilibrium’. In most parts of property 
law this does not pose a true problem: any need to have uniform law is virtually absent. 
It is a problem, however, where there is a need, namely in the !eld of security interests: 
here, the desire to create uniform law and the present practice as it has evolved in the past 
(adapted as it is to a national system of law) diverge.
This is all di"erent in case of the law of contract. The parties to a contract would not 
be truly hampered by a change of the law because of their ability to set the rules for 
their relationship themselves. The law of contract’s dynamic character guarantees the 
elimination and survival of rules that are respectively the least and the most suited for 
their new environment. Rubin says: ‘if  conditions change (. . .) and two individuals decide 
that, for their purposes, behaviour that was attractive in the past has ceased to be useful, 
they can voluntarily devise a new contract stipulating any behaviour that they wish’.34 
Evidence from both economic analysis of law and comparative law support this evolu-
tionary thesis. Economic analysis of law shows the need for a distinction between default 
and manda tory rules. This type of analysis makes clear that rules should be mandatory 
when any other rule that the parties would adopt would be violating third parties inter-
ests. Mattei and Cafaggi rightly point out that the amount of mandatory rules should 
decrease in a system where alternative means of protection for third parties are available. 
They mention, for example, there would be less mandatory rules in contract law if  the 
tort system protected third parties.35 It is obvious that property law is much more related 
to these mandatory rules than contract law. The economic reason for property law having 
more mandatory rules runs parallel to the evolutionary idea of property law being less 
able to change when confronted with a changing environment.
32 Gambaro (1997).
33 See further, Dreher (1999), 109: ‘Da Wissen und Kosten eng miteinander verbunden sind, 
stellt Unwissenheit zumindest vor Informationskosten und begrenzt so auch die Faktormobilität 
ganz entscheidend.’
34 Quoted by Benson (1998).
35 Mattei and Cafaggi (1998), 348.
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Comparative law also provides us with evidence on the evolutionary thesis. Legal trans-
plants in the !eld of contract law are far greater than in the !eld of property law. This 
may be partly due to private international law’s lex rei sitae (accordingly there is no need 
to incorporate foreign property rights into one’s own legal system), but it is certainly also 
due to the high costs of transplanting from another system in the case of property law 
and the much lower costs in the case of contract and tort law. In the latter, legal trans-
plants have been vigorous; the relative uniformity already existent in the !eld of European 
contract law is undoubtedly caused by these transplants. In particular, English law was 
to a great extent in$uenced by the civil law of the nineteenth century,36 as continental 
European law is in$uenced in the late twentieth century by the law of !nancial transac-
tions on, for example, swaps, lease and franchising, coming from the common law world.
The general lesson is that evolution of legal norms may not under all circumstances 
lead to an optimal outcome. Whether a national rule will be replaced by a new European 
or transnational one also depends on whether lawyers and other legal actors are willing 
to deviate from existing practices.
4.2 How Law Develops: A Race to the Bottom?
The second evolutionary insight useful to explain legal change is about the way in which 
evolution takes place. This is usually not through the complete extinction of a species, 
but through adaptation of it. Evolutionists would say the external identity of an organ-
ism remains identical while its contents changes. This phenomenon is well known in legal 
development as well. Legal concepts tend to change as to contents while remaining the 
same in terminology and outlook. Contract and property today have a completely dif-
ferent content compared to contract and property in Roman times or in the nineteenth 
century. This ‘Funktionswandel’ of a rule takes place more frequently than the clear- cut 
elimination of a rule.
Evolutionary theory also tells us that the direction in which adaptation takes place is 
usually toward simplicity, in particular when homogenization of the environment reduces 
the number of distinct niches available. The movement is toward complexity when there 
are only a few species that proliferate within a new environment with many un!lled 
niches.37 The more homogeneous an environment is, the more homogeneous the organ-
isms are. In the desert, organisms are less complex than in the rainforest. The interesting 
question is what this means in the context of legal harmonization. If  the direction of 
adaptation is indeed towards simplicity in case of homogenization of the environment, 
this is an indication of the direction private law would take in uniform economies (such 
as the one of the European Union). It seems likely that the more homogeneous the 
economy is, the more uniform the applicable private law will be. This !ts in remarkably 
well with the criticism usually expressed against allowing a spontaneous selection of the 
proper rules on the market. Critics of jurisdictional competition emphasize this may lead 
to a ‘race to the bottom’.38 If  private actors are free to choose the law applicable to their 
36 See Reimann, ed (1993).
37 Hirshleifer, supra note 23, 205.
38 See further, Kraus (1997) and Barnard (2000).
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 relationships with others, it is likely they will choose for the law of the jurisdiction with 
the lowest standards (like in the case of American company law the state of Delaware 
would be such a jurisdiction). The ‘home country control principle’ subsequently guaran-
tees this low standard to be exported to other jurisdictions. This race to the bottom may 
thus be said to arise when ‘in a deregulated internal market, a state unilaterally lowers its 
social standards in an attempt to attract business from other states’.39
The concerns usually expressed about this ‘race to the bottom’ are mostly normative: 
the possible lowering of standards is usually seen as a negative thing without too much 
evidence of this actually happening in practice. Evolutionary theory approaches the 
problem from a di"erent angle: it shows us to what extent a race to the bottom will indeed 
take place in a changing economic environment. Barnard shows there is little evidence so 
far of this phenomenon in Europe.40 She identi!es six conditions that have to be met if  
a race to the bottom is to emerge. Among these conditions are a wide choice of di"erent 
jurisdictions (like more than 50 legal systems in the United States) and full knowledge 
of each jurisdiction’s characteristics. These requirements are not met in Europe, where – 
until recently – there were only 15 jurisdictions and where it is often di#cult to obtain the 
necessary information about the various legal systems.
However, from the evolutionary perspective a race to the bottom is likely to emerge 
if  these two requirements are met in the future. As to the !rst requirement, the recent 
enlargement of the European Union with 12 new member- states implies that the di"er-
ences between the various systems could very well increase. A migration of companies 
toward jurisdictions with lower standards is then likely to occur. In order to meet the con-
dition of full knowledge of all the European jurisdictions, there is a need for more com-
parative law study. The only barrier for a true race to the bottom would be constituted by 
the minimum standards of law, set by the European Union’s directives and regulations. 
However, the fact that these standards are a barrier to evolution can also be explained by 
evolutionary theory: the path that has been traced out in the past has – in Europe – been 
one of not giving economic considerations the upper hand. A social policy was always 
part of the European venture. In this sense, the investments already made in this policy 
would be too costly (perhaps not only in a social or cultural sense, but also in a !nancial 
sense in that it would entail large costs of changing the present legal position of workers, 
unemployed, and so on) to deviate from.
But not all of  the present social guarantees in the European legal systems (namely 
those guaranteeing more than the European minimum standard) will be kept intact. 
Hayek is right when he stresses that legal rules may have come into being through his-
torical accident, but that natural selection decides which rules are to survive. The natural 
selection process then chooses between competing groups of humans, letting survive 
those groups whose cultural norms and rules are more suited to e#ciently coordinate 
social interactions.41 The European venture of creating a common market then implies 
it is the group of those who are best able to operate on that market whose rules will 
eventually survive.
39 Barnard (note 38) 57.
40 Id., 70.
41 Hayek (1967); see further the critical assessment by Vanberg (1993).
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4.3 Extinction or Living Together?
The third point is about the results of the evolutionary process. Does evolution lead to 
the survival of one organism only (with extinction of other organisms) or to di"erent 
organisms living together at the same time? Biology clearly shows that more !t organisms 
compete with less !t organisms in a constant struggle for survival.42 This is even the core 
of biodiversity. If  considered from the viewpoint of e#ciency or some other external 
goal, there would be no need for such diversity but this way of reasoning misses the point 
entirely. To consider biodiversity from a functional perspective would be absurd. The 
mere fact of some organisms being more successful than others is not relevant in this 
context: each organism has its proper place in the environment of which it is part. Also 
from the economic viewpoint, Cooter and Kornhauser have shown that evolution does 
not necessarily lead to only one surviving e#cient rule, but always to some equilibrium 
of better and worse rules.43
Is this evolutionary insight also of importance to understand legal change? I think it 
is: it can provide a theoretical explanation and justi!cation for legal diversity. The nor-
mative arguments in favour of legal diversity are well known.44 On the one hand, there 
is the argument of Tiebout45 that competition of legal systems leads to more preferences 
being satis!ed. If  legal actors can leave the jurisdiction they dislike (they can ‘vote with 
their feet’), national governments are stimulated to make their jurisdiction as attractive 
as possible. The introduction of uniform law would reduce this exit- opportunity and lead 
to less preferences being satis!ed. On the other hand, it is often claimed legal diversity 
enhances innovation of existing law: it allows jurisdictions to serve as ‘experimenting 
laboratories’.46
These two normative arguments for legal diversity can be supplemented with the evo-
lutionary insight that !t and less !t solutions often co- exist at the same time. This insight 
may not only be used to explain present- day legal diversity, but also to justify the exist-
ence of di"erent rules to deal with similar problems. In the latter meaning, biodiversity 
sets an example for the legal domain: it warns us for attempts to eliminate legal diversity 
in a centralist way. Instead of a European legislator identifying one ‘best rule’, the selec-
tion process should be left to practice. The result of this process may be that not one 
uniform rule emerges in the end, but this is nothing to worry about. It is the logical result 
of a spontaneous legal order created by natural selection.
42 Elliott, supra note 19, 70.
43 Cooter and Kornhauser (1980).
44 See further, e.g. Smits (2006).
45 Tiebout (1956). Also see Ogus (1999).
46 L. Brandeis, in: New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262: ‘It is one of the happy incidents 
of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if  its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; 
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.’
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5. CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this contribution was to establish whether evolutionary theory can help to 
explain the development of transnational commercial law and European private law. 
Increasing Europeanization and globalization lead away from traditional explanations 
for legal change founded in positivist and natural law thinking. The above shows that 
some evolutionary insights can indeed be applied. The necessary prerequisite for this 
is to consider law as an evolutionary organism and to apply the three requirements for 
natural selection to legal change. Once this hurdle is taken, three lessons from evolution-
ary theory can be applied to law.
The !rst lesson is about the importance of path dependence: just as organisms are 
shaped by now irreversible transformations in the past, the law is also a"ected by the path 
traced out in its previous development. Legal rules are therefore never completely shaped 
by the needs of their environment, but also dependent on their own characteristics. This 
works out in di"erent ways in di"erent areas of law. It is likely that transnational com-
mercial law and European contract law are the least a"ected by the factor nature and 
therefore the most susceptible for change.
Second, evolutionary insights are useful to explain how legal change takes place. It is 
usually not through the complete extinction of a species, but through adaptation that 
change happens. This adaptation is usually towards more simple species if  the environ-
ment becomes more homogeneous. This insight can be applied to law: legal diversity is 
likely to decrease in those areas where the environment becomes more uniform. There is 
little doubt this is the case in transnational commercial law and European private law. It 
remains uncertain whether this uniformity will manifest itself  as a ‘race to the bottom’.
The third lesson is that evolution often leaves diversity in place: several organisms exist 
at the same time. This insight can be used to explain why di"erent rules exist to deal with 
similar problems. This is also true at the European or global level: evolutionary theory 
can explain why competition of legal rules is to be preferred over centralist uni!cation of 
law. This does not mean that natural selection of rules will always produce optimal out-
comes, but this is because evolutionary theory does not say anything about desired law: it 
only provides a framework for explanation.
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